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With the development of machine learning, expectations for artificial intelligence (AI) technology are in-
creasing day by day. In particular, deep learning has shown enriched performance results in a variety of
fields. There are many applications that are closely related to our daily life, such as making significant deci-
sions in application area based on predictions or classifications, in which a deep learning (DL) model could
be relevant. Hence, if a DL model causes mispredictions or misclassifications due to malicious external in-
fluences, it can cause very large difficulties in real life. Moreover, training deep learning models involves
relying on an enormous amount of data and the training data often includes sensitive information. There-
fore, deep learning models should not expose the privacy of such data. In this paper, we reviewed the threats
and developed defense methods on the security of the models and the data privacy under the notion of SPAI:
Secure and Private AI. We also discuss current challenges and open issues.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Private AI, Secure AI, Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Homomorphic
Encryption, Differential Privacy, Adversarial Example, White-box Attack, Black-box Attack
1. INTRODUCTION
Advances of deep learning (DL) algorithms have transformed the solution of data-
driven problems in various applications in real life, including the use of large amounts
of patient data for health prediction services [Shickel et al. 2017]; autonomous security
audits from system logs [Buczak and Guven 2016]; and unmanned car driving powered
by visual object detections [Ren et al. 2015]. However, the vulnerabilities of DL systems
have been recently uncovered within a vast amount of literature. It is very dangerous
that these applications are based on little understandings of security and privacy on
DL systems.
Although many research studies have been published on both attacks and defense
with deep learning security and privacy, they are still fragmented. Hence we review
recent attempts toward Secure AI and Private AI. Addressing the need for robust ar-
This research was supported in part by Projects for Research and Development of Police science and Tech-
nology under Center for Research and Development of Police science and Technology and Korean National
Police Agency funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (PA-C000001), in part by Ba-
sic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the
Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning (grant number: 2016M3A7B4911115), in part by the National
Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (Ministry of Science and ICT)
[2018R1A2B3001628], and in part by the Brain Korea 21 Plus Project (Electrical and Computer Engineer-
ing, Seoul National University) in 2018.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned
by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or repub-
lish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request
permissions from permissions@acm.org.
c© YYYY ACM. 1539-9087/YYYY/01-ARTA $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
11
65
5v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 D
ec
 20
18
A:2
tificial intelligence (AI) systems in security and privacy, we develop a perspective on
SPAI: Secure and Private AI. Secure AI aims for AI systems that have high security
guarantees; Private AI aims for AI systems that preserve the data privacy. Addition-
ally, as a part of the effort to build the SPAI system, we review the fragmented findings
and attempts to address the attacks and defenses in deep learning security and pri-
vacy.
Secure AI focuses on attacks and defense with respect to AI systems, which, in terms
of DL, is a model. Based on the knowledge of the structure and parameters of the
model, attacks on DL models usually attempt to subvert the learning process or in-
duce false predictions on the purpose, by injecting adversarial samples. This type of
attack, which can include gradient-based techniques [Biggio et al. 2013; Goodfellow
et al. 2014b], is often called a white-box attack. In contrast, black-box attacks lead the
target system to make false predictions, without any information about the underlying
model. We observe that most of the attacks exploit the prediction confidence given by
the targeted model without knowing the model’s structure and parameters.
To defend from these attacks, methods such as adversarial training [Goodfellow et al.
2014b; Sun et al. 2018; Gu et al. 2018], gradient masking [Buckman et al. 2018; Dhillon
et al. 2018; Song et al. 2017], GAN [Samangouei et al. 2018; Song et al. 2017] and sta-
tistical approaches [Steinhardt et al. 2017; Paudice et al. 2018b,a] have been proposed.
Table III lists recent research on attacks with various models of deep learning, with
their structures and parameters, together with the defense against these attacks.
On the other hand, Private AI aims for the AI systems that preserve data privacy.
DL requires users to transfer some sensitive data to remote machines because of the
computational cost or the need for collaborative training. In such situations, users lose
control over the data after the transfer and have concerns about their data privacy
being stolen between transfers, or the service holders that they upload their data to
can misuse their data without consent. It was also claimed that only with the de-
ployed DL model can the data used for training the model be inversed [Hitaj et al.
2017]. Table IV describes the potential privacy threats and their corresponding de-
fence methods. Against such privacy threats, privacy-preserving techniques including
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gilad-Bachrach et al. 2016; Hesamifard et al.
2017; Chabanne et al. 2017; Bourse et al. 2017; Sanyal et al. 2018], differential pri-
vacy [Abadi et al. 2016b; Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009; Dwork et al. 2006, 2010;
Papernot et al. 2016a, 2018; McMahan et al. 2018; Ermis and Cemgil 2017], and se-
cure multi-party computation (SMC) [Shokri and Shmatikov 2015; Aono et al. 2018],
have been combined with the DL frameworks. Table V lists recent research on machine
learning attacks and defenses to expose the privacy of the training and test data.
We review recent research on privacy and security issues associated with deep learn-
ing in several domains. Additionally, we taxonomize possible attacks and the state-of-
the-art defense methods on Secure AI and Private AI. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first attempt to taxonomize approaches to privacy in deep learning.
1.1. Adversarial Examples in Real World Setting
The first adversarial attack started with an image in a non-targeted manner. An al-
ternative targeted attack soon developed maximizing the likelihood of the target class.
A recent targeted attack performed on the Google Cloud Vision (GCV) API compro-
mising commercial systems. This approach becomes problematic to the second service
provider because of the use of a decision-making service with given prediction score.
For example, a service provider that uses GCV API for the auto-driving will fail to stop
an adversarily crafted stop sign. [Elsayed et al. 2018]. Finlayson et al. [2018] extended
adversarial attacks to medical imaging tasks. Both white- and black-box attacks are
presented fooling medical deep learning classifiers. As such, Finlayson et al. [2018]
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Fig. 1: General DNN training process
showed that there is potential harm in the medical domain that can be caused by such
adversarial attacks. In addition to the medical domain, Carlini and Wagner [2018] pro-
posed the first adversarial examples of automatic speech recognition. They applied a
white-box iterative optimization-based attack and showed a 100% success rate, which
showed that the feasibility of adversarial attacks on an image can be transferred to
another domain. They reconstructed the waveform of input x to x+ υ while exploiting
conventional measure distortion, and they successfully produced speech to the desired
phrase with 99.9% similarity given any audio waveform.
2. BACKGROUND
Behind the success of deep learning lies the advancements of deep neural networks
(DNNs) trained with an extensive amount of data. In this section, we introduce the
components and the training algorithm of a DNN. Further, we describe the recent
DL models that are widely used. The building block of a neural network is an artificial
neuron, which was designed to resemble a human neuron. However, because the actual
biological activities inside human neurons are still uncovered, artificial neurons simply
compute the weighted sum of the input and activations, as follows:
y = σ(
n∑
i=1
wixi). (1)
where x is the input, y is the output, σ is the activation function, and w are the weights.
The artificial neurons are used as nodes to construct layers, and by piling up these lay-
ers deep neural networks (DNNs) are constructed. The activation functions are nonlin-
ear functions such as the sigmoid, tanh and ReLU. The nonlinearity of the activation
function piles up as the number of layers grows and enables DNNs to approximate
target functions without any handcrafted feature selections.
2.1. Artificial Intelligence powered by Deep Learning
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Fig. 2: Different DNN model structures
2.1.1. Deep Learning Workflow—Training and Inference. The workflow of the DL con-
tains two phases: training and inference. DNNs learn new capabilities through the
training phase from the existing data, and the learned capabilities are applied to un-
seen data at the inference phase.
The overview of the DNN training process is described in Figure 1. DNNs are trained
by iterating feedforward and backpropagation until convergence. At the feedforward
stage, the input propagates along the layers to computes the output. Then, to minimize
the error between the output and the actual label, the gradient descent algorithm is
used,
w ← w − η∇wJ(w) (2)
where a loss function J(w) is used for the weight parameters w and the learning rate η.
Hence, at each backpropagation stage, each node computes the gradient and updates
the weight parameters as described in Equation 2. However, it is highly inefficient
to iterate the process for the full batch of the data (all instances in the data) since
the training data required for the DNN training is enormous. Therefore, mini-batch
stochastic gradient descent (mini-batch SGD or SGD) is widely used. After the model
converges to a certain accuracy or loss value, the model is used for prediction at the
inference stage. At the inference phase, the model only forward propagates the input
and regards the output as a prediction.
2.1.2. Different Types of Deep Neural Network Models. Different DNN model architec-
tures are described in Fig. 2
— Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN). An FNN is the most basic structure of the
DNNs. It contains multiple layers, and the nodes between layers are fully connected
while the intra-layer nodes are not connected to one another.
— Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). A general architecture of CNNs is de-
scribed in Fig. 2(a). A CNN consists of one or more convolutional layers, which use
convolutional operations to compute layer-wise results. This operation allows the
network to learn about spatial information and hence CNNs show outstanding per-
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formances especially on vision applications [Krizhevsky et al. 2012; He et al. 2016;
Huang et al. 2017a].
— Recurrent Neural Network (RNN). A recurrent neural network (RNN) is widely
used to process sequential data. As illustrated in Fig. 2(b), an RNN updates the
current hidden unit and calculates the output based on the current input and past
hidden unit. There are well-known problems of RNNs such as the gradient vanish-
ing problem, and some variants, such as Long short-term memory [Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber 1997] and Gated recurrent unit [Cho et al. 2014] have been proposed
to solve such problems.
— Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). A generative adversarial network
(GAN) framework [Goodfellow et al. 2014a] consists of a discriminator D and a gen-
erator G. G generates fake data while D determines whether the generated data
is real, as depicted in Fig. 2(c). Usually generators and discriminators are neural
networks that can have various structures depending on the application. GANs are
actively studied in various fields, such as image/speech synthesis and domain adap-
tation.
2.2. Privacy-preserving Techniques
2.2.1. Homomorphic Encryption. An encryption scheme that allows arbitrary compu-
tations on encrypted data without decrypting it or having access to any decryption
key, is called homomorphic encryption (HE). In other words, the encryption scheme
Enc satisfies the following equation:
Enc(a)  Enc(b) = Enc(a ∗ b) (3)
where Enc : X → Y is a homomorphic ecnryption scheme with X a set of messages and
Y a set of cyphertexts. a, b are messages in X , and ∗,  are linear operations defined in
X ,Y, respectively.
Homomorphic cryptosystems in early stages were partial homomorphic cryptosys-
tems [ElGamal 1985; Goldwasser and Micali 1982; Benaloh 1994; Paillier 1999], that
showed either additive or multiplicative homomorphism [Gentry and Boneh 2009].
However, after the work by Gentry and Boneh [2009] using ideal lattices was in-
troduced, various attempts on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), which allows
any computable function to be performed on the encrypted data, have been pro-
posed [Van Dijk et al. 2010; Yagisawa 2015; Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2014; Bos
et al. 2013; Hesamifard et al. 2017; Ducas and Micciancio 2015].
Although FHE can benefit many applications including cloud computing platforms
and secure multi-party computation, the use of massive data inputs and computational
workloads as well as the nonlinearity in DL models, is still a burden to be combined
with deep learning.
2.2.2. Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is one of the state-of-the-art privacy
preserving models [Dwork 2008]; it guarantees that an attacker cannot deduce any
private information with high confidence from databases or released models. In other
words, differential private algorithms prevent an attacker from knowing the existence
of a particular record by adding noise to the query responses.
Here is the attack scenario that is assumed in differential privacy algorithms: An
attacker is allowed to query two adjacent databases, which vary in at most one record.
By sending the same query to both databases, the difference between the respective
responses is considered to arise from “one record.” For example, imagine that there is
a database D on weights and one can query only the average value of all records. In
this situation, it is impossible to grasp a specific person’s weight. However, if a new
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record is added and the attacker knows the former average weight, it is possible for
the attacker to figure out the weight of the person added.
Differential privacy counters such privacy threats by adding noise to the response
as follows:
M(D) = f(D) + n (4)
where M : D → R is a randomized mechanism that applies the noise n to the query
response; D is the target database, and f is the original query response, which is de-
terministic.
M gives ε-differential privacy if all adjacent D and D′ satisfy the following:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] (5)
where D and D′ are two adjacent databases, and S ⊆ Range(M) is a subset of R. ε is the
privacy budget that controls the privacy level; the smaller ε is determined, the more
similar M(D) and M(D′) are required to be. These facts show that there is a trade-off
between the data utility and the privacy level.
Since Equation. 5 is a strict condition, (ε, δ)-differential privacy introduces the δ
term, which loosens the bound of error by the amount of δ. In other words, δ allows
M to satisfy the differential privacy condition even if the probabilities are somewhat
different. The definition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy holds when the following equation
is satisfied:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ (6)
where δ is another privacy budget which controls the privacy (confidence) levels.
Usually, the noise is sampled from the Laplace distribution or Gaussian distribu-
tion [Dwork 2008]. Each distribution depends on the sensitivity and privacy budgets.
The sensitivity ∆f [Dwork 2008] of the query response function f captures how much
one record can affect the output, and it can be calculated as the maximum difference
between responses on the adjacent databases:
∆f = max
D,D′
|f(D)− f(D′)|. (7)
A larger sensitivity demands a larger amount of noise under the same privacy bud-
get. There are some useful theories in which the composition of differential private
mechanisms is also a differential private mechanism. Composition theorem [Dwork
et al. 2006; Dwork and Lei 2009], advanced composition theorem [Kairouz et al. 2013;
Dwork et al. 2010; Bun and Steinke 2016] and moment accountant [Abadi et al. 2016b]
have been proposed.
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Table I: Attack methods against Secure AI
White-box Black-box Training Phase Inference Phase
Adversarial Attack Types↓ (Figure 4a) (Figure 4b)
Evasion X X X
Poisoning X X
Table II: Secure vulnerability in AI
Attack Modes Algorithms Reference
White-box
L-BFGS [Szegedy et al. 2013]
Evasion FGSM [Goodfellow et al. 2014b]
JSMA [Papernot et al. 2016a]
iFGSM [Kurakin et al. 2016a]
CW Attack [Carlini and Wagner 2017b]
UAP [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017]
Attacks on RL [Huang et al. 2017b]
ATN [Baluja and Fischer 2017]
AS attack [Athalye and Sutskever 2017]
Momentum iFGSM [Dong et al. 2017]
BPDA [Athalye et al. 2018]
Black-box
Hacking smart machines [Ateniese et al. 2015]
Adversarial examples Physical world [Kurakin et al. 2016a]
Autoregressive model [Alfeld et al. 2016]
Adversarial attacks on policies [Huang et al. 2017b]
Malware classification [Grosse et al. 2016]
Practical black-box attack [Papernot et al. 2017]
Membership training [Long et al. 2017]
Physical world AE [Kurakin et al. 2016a]
Policy induction attack [Behzadan and Munir 2017]
Human AE [Elsayed et al. 2018]
Poisoning Poisoning attack against SVM [Biggio et al. 2012]
Optimal teaching [Patil et al. 2014]
Optimal Training-set attacks [Mei and Zhu 2015]
Back-gradient optimization [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2017]
Generative poisoning attack [Yang et al. 2017]
Targeted backdoor attack [Chen et al. 2017]
3. SECURE AI
Deep learning is applied to various fields ranging from autonomous driving to medical
diagnosis. Hence, if the deep learning models are exposed to hostile influences that can
destroy the training process or derive unintended behaviors from the pre-trained mod-
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Table III: Corresponding defense methods to secure vulnerability in AI
Defense Modes Algorithms Reference
Gradient
Masking
Evasion Distillation defense [Papernot et al. 2016b]
AS attack [Athalye and Sutskever 2017]
Ensemble defense [Carlini and Wagner 2017a]
Efficient defense [Zantedeschi et al. 2017]
Ensemble adversarial learning [He et al. 2017]
Randomization [Xie et al. 2017]
Unified Embedding adversarial learning [Na et al. 2017]
Provable defenses [Kolter and Wong 2017]
Principled adversarial training [Sinha et al. 2017]
Input transformations adversarial learning [Guo et al. 2017]
Manifold defense [Ilyas et al. 2017]
Ensemble adversarial training [Trame`r et al. 2017]
Unified Embedding adversarial learning [Na et al. 2017]
Detecting perturbations [Metzen et al. 2017]
L1 based adversarial learning [Sharma and Chen 2017]
Pixel-defend [Song et al. 2017]
Defense-GAN [Samangouei et al. 2018]
Characterizing subspaces adversarial learning [Ma et al. 2018]
Stochastic activation pruning [Dhillon et al. 2018]
Thermometer defense [Buckman et al. 2018]
Adversarial
Training
Harnessing adversarial examples [Goodfellow et al. 2014b]
Adversarial learning at scale [Kurakin et al. 2016b]
Adversary A3C for RL [Gu et al. 2018]
Speech recognition adversarial examples [Sun et al. 2018]
BPDA [Athalye et al. 2018]
GAN
Pixel-defend [Song et al. 2017]
Defense-GAN adversarial learning [Samangouei et al. 2018]
Statistical
Approach
Certified defenses [Steinhardt et al. 2017]
Back-gradient optimization [Paudice et al. 2018b]
Anomaly detection [Paudice et al. 2018a]
Poisoning Certified defense [Steinhardt et al. 2017]
Influence functions [Koh and Liang 2017]
Anomaly detection [Paudice et al. 2018b]
Label flipping poisoning attack [Paudice et al. 2018a]
Table IV: Potential privacy threats against private AI and the corresponding defense
methods
Homomorphic Differential Secure Multi-party
Potential Threats by Role↓ Encryption Privacy Training
Model & Service Providers X
Information Silos X X X
DL Service Users X
els, they can result in terrible consequences in real life. For example, it was recently
revealed that one can fool the autonomous driving system by jamming sensors [Yan
et al. 2016]. Likewise, if someone can somehow change the input of the autonomous
driving model to an adversarial example, it can even lead the passengers to death.
Hence, we suggest the concept of Secure AI, which means the AI system with secu-
rity guarantees, in order to encourage the studies on the security of the AI systems.
As deep learning is one of the state-of-the-art AI algorithms, we introduce and taxono-
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Table V: A list of defending techniques of private AI in order of appearance: DL stands
for deep learning, HE stands for homomorphic encryption, DP stands for differential
Privacy and SMC stands for secure multi-party computation
Algorithm HE DP SMC Reference
CryptoNets X [Gilad-Bachrach et al. 2016]
CryptoDL X [Hesamifard et al. 2017]
Privacy-preserving classification X [Chabanne et al. 2017]
TAPAS X [Sanyal et al. 2018]
FHE-DiNN X [Bourse et al. 2017]
DP-SGD X [Abadi et al. 2016b]
DP LSTM X [McMahan et al. 2018]
DPGAN X [Xie et al. 2018]
DPGM X [Acs et al. 2018]
DP Model Publishing X [Yu et al. 2019]
Privacy-preserving logistic re-
gression
X [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009]
dPA X [Phan et al. 2016]
dCDBN X [Phan et al. 2017a]
AdLM X [Phan et al. 2017b]
PATE X [Papernot et al. 2016a]
Scalable private learning X [Papernot et al. 2018]
Generating DP datasets X [Triastcyn and Faltings 2018]
DSSGD X [Shokri and Shmatikov 2015]
Privacy-preserving DL via addi-
tively HE
X X [Aono et al. 2018]
SecureML X X [Mohassel and Zhang 2017]
MiniONN X X [Liu et al. 2017]
DeepSecure X [Rouhani et al. 2018]
Gazelle X [Juvekar et al. 2018]
mize groups of studies on attacks on deep learning models and defenses against those
attacks.
3.1. Security Attacks on Deep Learning Models
In this section, we will describe two major attacks on deep learning depending on
which phase of the workflow of machine learning is interfered: poisoning attack and
evasion attack as described in Table I. If the attack engages in the training phase and
tries to destroy the model while training, it is called the poisoning attack and the ex-
ample used in this attack is referred as an adversarial training example. On the other
hand, adversarial (test) examples are used in the inference phase and intentionally
lead the model to misclassify the input. This attack is called the evasion attack.
As well as phase of workflow, Attack scenarios on deep learning models can be dif-
fered by the amount of information that the attacker has about the model. If the at-
tacker has full access to all information in the model, including the model structure
and the values of all parameters, it shows high attack success rate that can not exist in
reality. If the adversary has limited information about the model such as the predicted
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label of the input or limited authority, it is hard to attack and need alternative method
like a substitute model or data.
Depending on the attacker’s goal, moreover, the attacks can be divided into targeted
and non-targeted attacks. That is, if the adversary aims to alter the classifier’s output
to some pre-specific target label, this attack is called a targeted attack; in the case of
non-targeted attack, the adversary’s goal is to make the classifier choose any incor-
rect label. Generally, a non-targeted attack shows higher success rate compared to a
targeted one.
3.1.1. Evasion Attack.
White-box Attack. The initial study on evasion attacks started from [Szegedy et al.
2013]. Szegedy et al. [2013] suggested the idea of using the limited-memory Broy-
den–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (L-BFGS) algorithm to generate an adversarial exam-
ple. The authors propose a targeted attack method, which involves solving the simple
box-constrained optimization problem of
minimize ‖n‖2
s.t. f(x+ n) = l˜,
(8)
where x ∈ RI×J×K is the untainted image (I × J ×K represents the height, width and
channel of the image), and l˜ ∈ {1...k} is the target label; and n represents the minimum
amount of noise needed to disassociate the image from its true label. This method is
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Targeted Untargeted
L-BFGS (2013) FGSM (2014)
iFGSM (2016)JSMA (2015)
CW Attack (2016) UAP (2016)
ATN (2017)
AS Attack (2017)
Momentum iFGSM (2017)
BPDA (2018)
Fig. 6: White-box targeted vs. non-targeted attack methods. Abbreviation: L-
BFGS [Szegedy et al. 2013] = Limited-memory Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno,
FGSM [Goodfellow et al. 2014b] = Fast Gradient Sign Method, JSMA [Papernot et al.
2016a] = Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack, CW attack [Carlini and Wagner 2017b]
= Carlini’s and Wagner’s attack, UAP [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017] = Universal Ad-
versarial Perturbation, ATN [Baluja and Fischer 2017] = Adversarial transformation
networks, AS attack [Athalye and Sutskever 2017] = Athalye’s and Sutskever’s attack,
and BPDA [Athalye et al. 2018] = Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation.
designed to find the smallest perturbation needed for a successful attack. Sometimes
it creates an inapplicable adversarial perturbation n, which performs only the role of
blurring the image. This form of attack has a high misclassification rate but also a
high computational cost since the adversarial examples are generated as a result of
solving the optimization problem in Equation 8 via a box-constrained L-BFGS.
On the other hand, Carlini’s and Wagner’s attack (CW attack) [Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017b] is based on the L-BFGS attack [Szegedy et al. 2013], and it modifies the
optimization problem in Equation 8 as
minimize D (x˜, x) + c · g (x˜) (9)
where D is a distance metric that includes Lp, L0, L2, and L∞, g(x˜) is an objective
function in which f(x˜) = l˜ if and only if g(x˜) ≤ 0 and c > 0 is a properly chosen con-
stant. This modification enables Equation 9 to be solved by the existing optimization
algorithms. The use of the Adam [Kingma and Ba 2014] optimizer enhances the effec-
tiveness in finding adversarial examples quickly. For relaxation, they use the method
of change of variables or projection into box constraints for each optimization step.
Papernot et al. [2016a] introduced a targeted attack method, that optimizes under
the L0 distance, which is known as the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA).
It constructs a saliency map based on the gradient derived from the feedforward prop-
agation and modifies the input features that maximize the saliency map in a way that
increases the probability to be classified as target label l˜.
In general, a deep learning model is described as non-linear and overfitting, but in
[Goodfellow et al. 2014b], they introduce the fast gradient sign method (FGSM). Good-
fellow et al. [2014b] assert that the main vulnerability of neural networks to adver-
sarial perturbation is caused by their linear nature. Their method linearizes the cost
function around the present value, and finds its maximum value from the following
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closed-form equation as follows:
x˜ = x+ υ · sign(∇xJ(w, x, l˜)) (10)
where x˜ is the adversarial example; x is the untainted input to the model, and l˜ is the
target label; υ decides how strong the adversarial perturbation is that is applied to the
image, and J is the cost function to train the network. Although the proposed method
can generate adversarial examples with relatively low computational costs, it shows a
low success rate.
To overcome the shortcomings of the previous two ideas, various compromises have
been made, and iterative FGSM [Kurakin et al. 2016a] is one of them. Iterative FGSM
utilizes a specialized iterative optimization. It utilizes the FGSM for several steps but
with a smaller step size. The clip function implements a per-pixel clipping of the image.
Technically, the result will be in L∞ ε-neighborhood of the original image. The detailed
update rule is described as follows:
x˜0 = x, x˜N+1 = Clipx,υ
{
x˜N + υ · sign(∇xJ(w, x˜N , l˜)))
}
(11)
where x˜ is the adversarial example iteratively optimized, and x˜N is the intermediate
result in the N-th iteration. As a result, it showed improved performance in terms of
the generation throughput and the success rate.
Using the iterative method proposed above, Dong et al. [2017] added a momen-
tum term to improve the transferability of the generated adversarial examples as de-
scribed in Figure 5. It was presented in the Adversarial Attacks and Defences Competi-
tion [Dong et al. 2017] at NIPS 2017, and it won the first place in both the non-targeted
attack and targeted attack tracks. The main idea of the paper is as follows:
gN+1 = µ · gN +
∇xJ
(
f (x˜) , l˜
)
∥∥∥∇xJ (f (x˜) , l˜)∥∥∥
1
, xN+1 = Clipx,υ {x˜+ υ · sign(gN+1))} . (12)
Compared to Equation 11, adding the gN decay provides the momentum with a gradi-
ent.
An adversarial transformation network (ATN) [Baluja and Fischer 2017] is another
targeted attack method. An ATN is a neural network trained to generate a targeted
adversarial examples with minimal modification from the original input, making it
hard to differentiate from the clean examples.
Beyond adding different noise values per input for misclassification, universal ad-
versarial perturbations [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017] show the presence of universal
(image-agnostic) perturbation vectors that cause all natural images in a dataset to be
misclassified at a high probability. The main focus of the paper is to find a perturba-
tion vector n ∈ RI×J×K that tricks the samples in the dataset. Here, µ represents the
dataset that contains all of the samples.
kˆ (x+ n) 6= kˆ (x) , for most x ∼ µ. (13)
The noise n should satisfy the following conditions of ‖n‖p ≤ ξ, and the conditions of:
P
x∼µ
(
kˆ (x+ n) 6= ˆk (x)
)
≥ 1− δ, (14)
where kˆ is the classifier; ξ limits the value of the perturbation, and δ quantifies the
specified fooling rate for all images.
In the case of most adversarial attacks, the efficacy of each attack can be decreased
via transformations, such as viewpoint shift and camera noise. There is a very low per-
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Fig. 7: Historical timeline of white-box attacks. (Abbreviations: L-BFGS [Szegedy
et al. 2013] = Limited-memory Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno, FGSM [Good-
fellow et al. 2014b] = Fast Gradient Sign Method, JSMA [Papernot et al. 2016a] =
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack, CW attack [Carlini and Wagner 2017b] = Car-
lini’s and Wagner’s attack, UAP [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017] = Universal Adversar-
ial Perturbation, ATN [Baluja and Fischer 2017] = Adversarial transformation net-
works, AS attack [Athalye and Sutskever 2017] = Athalye’s and Sutskever’s attack,
and BPDA [Athalye et al. 2018] = Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation.) Red:
CW attack is an advanced idea of L-BFGS. Purple: Like mentioned on each title, FGSM
is a basic idea of Iterative and Momentum Iterative FGSMs. Green: UAP and AS attack
methods created the idea of generating a special perturbation that is robust to either
image preprocessing or resource limitation. Pink: BPDA defeated a recently proposed
large number of gradient masking defenses
centage of cases in which the image to which an adversarial noise is added directly ap-
plies to the classifier in the system of a physical world. They usually have some steps of
preprocessing and angle changing for adjustment. Athalye and Sutskever [2017] pro-
poses a method to overcome this current limitation by generating a perturbation that
makes the input have a variety of distortions such as random rotation, or translation,
and the addition of noise is implemented to be misclassified in a classifier. In addition,
they use a visual difference for a boundary radius ball constraint instead of a distance
in a texture space.
A backward pass differential approach attack method [Athalye et al. 2018] has been
recently proposed, which is capable of preventing recent gradient masking defense
methods. The authors claim that finding defenses that rely on recently suggested gra-
dient masking methods can be circumvented by performing the backward pass with
the identity function, which is for approximating true gradients.
Black-box attack. In the real world, accessing models or data sets that are used
for training the model, or both are too difficult. Although there are a huge public data
(Image, sound, video and etc.), an internal data used for training models from indus-
tries still secret. Moreover, models contained in mobile devices are not accessible to
attackers. The Black-box attack assumes a situation similar to reality. The attacker
has no information about the model and the dataset. The available information is the
input format and the output label of a target model the same as when using a mobile
application. A target model can be the models hosted by Amazon and Google. In the
case of attacker wants to create an aggressive example exploiting gradients, the at-
tacker needs to replace a model as the access to of the targeted model is restricted to
the attackers. Black box attack is a replicating a target model without knowledge of
the architecture of the target model.
According to Szegedy et al. [2013]; Goodfellow et al. [2014b], neural networks can
attack other models regardless of the number of layers and the number of hidden
nodes as long as the target task is the same. These authors considered this finding to
be due to the neural networks’s linear nature, in contrast to previous works in that the
transferability is due to the nonlinearity of the neural network. Activation function
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(a) Classifier of clean data (b) Classifier of poisoned data
Fig. 8: The functionality of poisoning a sample. (a) The decision boundary after training
with normal data, (b) The decision boundary after injecting a poisoning sample.
of sigmoid of ReLU is well known to produce a non-linearity. The sigmoid has the
advantage of nonlinearity, but it is tricky to use in learning. On the other hand, ReLU
is widely used because it is easy to learn with, but non-linearity does not grow as
with sigmoid. Thus, the replication of the target models can learn a similar decision
boundary since the target task is the same.
Moreover, Papernot et al. [2016b] showed that transfer is possible between tradi-
tional machine learning techniques and neural networks using the experiment’s intra-
technique transferability; between the same algorithms but different initialization;
cross-technique transferability; between different algorithm like SVM and neural net-
works. For example, Kurakin et al. [2016a] assumes the case in which a model obtain
input by a camera or sensors that is not directly obtained, and as a result, it attacks
a neural network using the pictures of the attacks. The attack still operated and thus,
this approach showed robustness to transformation.
As described above, the transfer attack is possible by making a substitute model
for a target. In the process of the substitution of a target model, it is possible to use
an approximate architecture such as the CNN, RNN, and MLP exploiting the input
format (image or sequence). The model can be trained by collecting data similar to
the data obtained by learning the target from the public. However, The cost of col-
lecting is enormous. Papernot et al. [2017] solved this issue using an initial synthetic
dataset and Jacobian-based data augmentation method. If the dataset of the target is
MNIST, then the initial synthetic dataset can be handcrafted digital digit images ap-
proximately 100 or the subset of a test set that is not used when training the targets.
The label can be obtained by putting the data as a input in oracle which is the target
model. After training the substitute using the input and label pair, the authors crafted
an adversarial example using Goodfellow et al. [2014b] and Papernot et al. [2016b].
The results of the experiment on the transferability of the MNIST case showed about
90% success rate that corresponded to the epsilon range of 0.5–0.9. However, if an
attacker wants to label its inputs by blowing queries to a service such as Google or
Amazon, the attacker has a limited number of queries or a high probability of being
caught by the detector due to the large number of instances. To release this problem,
Papernot et al. [2016b] introduced reservoir sampling, and it effectively reduced the
number of data instances needed to train the substitute.
3.1.2. Poisoning Attack. If the evasion attack is to avoid the decision boundary of the
classifier at the test time, the poisoning attack intentionally inserts a malicious exam-
ple into the training set at the training time in such a way as to interfere with the
learning of the model or to attack at the test time more easily. There is a large number
of poisoning attack methods that can be successfully applied to traditional machine
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learning such as SVM or LASSO, but there are only a few for neural networks. The
tradition poisoning attack can be expressed mathematically, but neural networks have
been difficult to poison because of their complexity. A poisoning attack can be divided
into a white-box and black-box attack similar to an evasion attack, but it will be ex-
pressed as strong adversaries and weak adversaries to make a concrete expression
suitable for poisoning attack. The goal of adversaries could be to completely ruin the
learning of the system or to make the backdoor to be recognized as a man of power
with authentication when deployed.
Strong adversaries refer to adversaries with powerful permissions that can ma-
nipulate the parameter values of the model with direct access to the model and training
data, similar to a white-box attack, or poison the training data to spoil the learning.
Their main purpose is to subvert the training process by injecting malicious samples,
but the accessibility can be different. The authors of Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [2017] pre-
sented two attack scenarios of strong adversaries, which are perfect-knowledge (PK)
attacks and limited-knowledge (LK) attacks. As the terms suggest, a PK attack sce-
nario is an unrealistic setting, and hence, it is only assumed for a worst-case evaluation
of the attack. On the other hand, under LK attack scenarios, the typical knowledge that
the attacker possesses, is described as θ = (Dˆ,X ,M, wˆ), where X is the feature repre-
sentation andM is the learning algorithm. The hat symbol denotes limited knowledge
of a given component; Dˆ is the surrogate data available to the attacker, and wˆ is the
learned parameter from Dˆ.
D∗c ∈ arg max
D′c∈φ(Dc)
A(D′c, θ) = J(Dˆval, wˆ)
s.t. wˆ ∈ arg min
w′∈W
J(Dˆtr ∪ D′c, w′)
(15)
where the surrogate data Dˆ is divided into the training data Dˆtr and validation data
Dˆval. A(D′c, θ) is an objective function that evaluates the impact of the adversarial ex-
amples on the clean examples, and it can be defined in terms of a loss function and
J(Dˆval), which measures the performance of the surrogated model using ˆDval. The op-
timization problem comprised of bilevel optimization and the influence of Dc is propa-
gated using wˆ. The goal of the optimization is to ruin the system, and the label of the
poison is generic. If a specific target is required, the Equation 15 is changed to
A(D′c, θ) = −J(Dˆ′val, wˆ) (16)
where Dˆ′val is the manipulated validation set, which contains the same data as Dˆ but
with misclassified labels for the desired output. Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [2017] proposed
the back-gradient optimization to solve the Equation 15 or 16 and generated poison-
ing examples, and compared with the previous gradient-based optimization methods.
Since gradient-based optimization requires a strict convexity assumption of the ob-
jective function and Hessian-vector product, Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [2017] argue that
such an approach is not applicable to complex learning algorithms including neural
networks and deep learning architectures. In addition, Yang et al. [2017] introduce
the possibility of applying the gradient-based method to DNNs, and they develop a
generative method inspired by the concept of GAN [Goodfellow et al. 2014a]. Rather
than computing the gradients directly, Goodfellow et al. [2014a] used an auto-encoder
as a generator. Hence, the results show a speed up of the more than 200x compared to
the gradient-based method.
A weak adversary has a capability that insider intruders can add a few poisoned
samples without having authority for model or training. In contrast to previous studies
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that assume strong adversaries, Chen et al. [2017] introduce three constraints: 1) no
knowledge of the model, 2) injecting a small fraction of training data, and 3) poisoning
data not detected by humans. This is based on situations similar to the real world.
They proposed two methods, input-instance-key strategies and pattern key strategies,
for weaker adversaries to break the security and obtain privilege of the face recogni-
tion system. The former is to make an image be a key image, and makes it recognized
as a targeted label. In consideration of the situation of going through the camera, sev-
eral random noise add to sample. In the latter case, three strategies exist: 1) blended
injection strategy, 2) accessory injection strategy, and 3) blended accessory injection
strategy. The first is to blend a kitty image or a random pattern onto the input image.
However, it is unreasonable to add a specific pattern to the image captured by the cam-
era in real situations, and thus, the second is to apply an accessory such as glasses or
sunglasses to the input. It is easy to use at inference stage. When training, the parts
other than the glasses have the same value as the input image, and the pixel values
of the glasses are applied only to the glasses. The last method combines the first and
the second. Unlike previous studies in which poisoning data accounted for 20 percent
of the training data, only five poisoned samples were added when 600,000 training
images were used for instance-key, and approximately 50 poisoned samples were used
for pattern-key strategies. They were able to create a successful backdoor by adding a
small fraction of poisoned samples.
Even if a small number of samples are placed in the training data, the attack may
become useless when the data is preprocessed by the experts or crawled directly on the
web and labeled by the experts. The above attacks can not guarantee success without
inside intruders. In order to cope with this situation, Shafahi et al. [2018] adopts a
method of changing the feature representation of the input, unlike the conventional
method of changing the label. For example, when there is a image of a dog and a
bird, it uses a gradient of the model to change the dog to have a bird-like feature
representation. At this time, a picture of a dog is called a base image, and a picture
of a bird is called a target image. The goal is to change the decision boundary by
adding a perturbed base image to the training data using a gradient. As a result, the
target image is misclassified as a class of base image and the target can be used as a
key to exploit the model at will of the attacker. The authors experiment the attacks
in two retraining situations: end-to-end learning which fine-tunes entire model and
transfer learning which fine-tunes only final layer. The explained method using a base
and a target image called a one-shot kill attack is successfully applied to transfer
learning which change decision boundary dramatically, but are not applied to end-to-
end learning which change the lower layer extracting fundamental features. From this,
Shafahi et al. [2018] have succeeded in poisoning attack by proposing watermarking
method of projecting target image to base image by adjusting opacity and multiple
poison instances attacks using several target and base images to create attack sample
efficiently.
3.2. Defense Techniques against Deep Learning Models
There are variety types of defense techniques against deep learning models. Defense
techniques can be categorized in two big groups which are evasion and poisoning. De-
fense techniques against evasion attacks can be further categorized into two groups,
namely, non-obfuscated gradient masking (which includes adversarial training), and
obfuscated gradient masking. Defense techniques are used not limited to attacks but
also used to improve prediction results. For example, Kurakin et al. [2016b] suggests
that adversarial training can be employed in the scenario of a) when a model is over-
fitting, and b) when security against adversarial examples is a concern. For example,
the recent work on speech data [Sun et al. 2018] trained the DNN using adversarial
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examples along with the clean examples, to increase the robustness against evasion
attacks.
3.2.1. Defense Techniques Against Evasion Attacks. The basic idea of gradient masking
is to have a method that augments the adversarial examples, which is created by mak-
ing the gradients point slightly farther than a decision boundary with clean examples
and a method that makes use of techniques that hand over incorrect or foggy gradients
to an adversary; these are both currently under the category of gradient masking.
Non-Obfuscated Gradient Masking Currently, most representative studies of
non-obfuscated gradient masking involve adversarial training [Szegedy et al. 2013],
[Goodfellow et al. 2014b]. As a monumental article, it is still one of the significant
methods among the various gradient masking methods. A robust model to an expected
adversarial attack can be implemented by augmenting the training set with truly la-
beled adversarial examples. [Szegedy et al. 2013] showed that adversarial example of
Equation 10 could be used as regularizer by training on a mixture of clean and ad-
versarial examples. The regularizer with an objective function based on the FGSM
methods by training with on the mixture examples is formalized as follows:
J(θ, x, l) = αJ(θ, x, l) + (1− α) · J(θ, x+ υ · sign(∇xJ(w, x, l))). (17)
The adversarial training procedure can be interpreted as minimizing the worst case
error with a perturbed data by an adversary. The adversarial training can also be
seen as learning to play an adversarial game with the model which is able to request
labels on new points. Goodfellow et al. [2014b] explains generalization aspect of ad-
versarial examples to support adversarial training. We often notice that an example
generated for a model is often misclassified by other models. The behavior occurs due
to extreme non-linearity and over-fitting cannot account for various different behav-
iors. For this, Goodfellow et al. [2013] suggested that the generative training could
provide more constraint on the training process enforcing a model to distinguish real
from fake data. The generative training limits the direction of perturbation by training
across different models that have similar functions when trained to perform the same
task.
Adversarial training originally developed for small model with MNIST that did not
use batch normalization. Kurakin et al. [2016b] extended the original work to Im-
ageNet [Deng et al. 2009] adding batch normalization step. The relative weight of
adversarial examples are independently controlled in each batch with following loss
function:
J =
1
(m− k) + λk (
∑
CLEAN
(xi|li) + λ
∑
ADV
J(x˜i|li)) (18)
where J(x|l) is a loss on a single example x with true class l; m is total number of
training in the minibatch; k is the number of adversarial examples in the minibatch
and λ is a parameter for the relative weight of adversarial examples in the loss.
In 2018, Trame`r et al. [2017] proposed a defense method with Ensemble adversarial
training that is also robust to black-box attacks by containing adversarial examples
generated from other models. The approach decouples adversarial example generation
from the trained model to increase diversity of perturbations seen during training.
Trame`r et al. [2017] introduces a connection between Ensemble adversarial training
and multiple-source domain adaptation [Mansour et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2012]. As-
suming a target distribution takes a role of unseen black-box adversary, the output
has bounded error on attacks from a future black-box adversary.
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Table VI: Mapping continuous-valued input to quantized inputs, one-hot coding, and
thermometer codes.
Real-valued Quantized One-hot Thermometer
0.13 0.15 [0100000000] [0111111111]
0.66 0.65 [0000001000] [0000001111]
0.92 0.95 [0000000001] [0000000001]
Obfuscated Gradient Masking The defense approaches against obfuscated gradi-
ent masking in general follow three types of obfuscated gradients, which are shattered
gradients, stochastic gradients and vanishing/exploding gradient [Athalye et al. 2018].
Having shattered gradients means that incorrect gradients are achieved by mak-
ing the model intentionally non-differentiable operationally or unintentionally numer-
ically unstable. The purpose of a shattered gradient attack is to break this linearity
with the consideration of the neural network, which in general, behaves in a largely
linear manner [Athalye and Sutskever 2017]. In the case of images and other high
dimensional space, the linearity will have a large effect on the model’s prediction with
small values of , making the model vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A recent defense
algorithm over the shattered gradient technique is to exploit thermometer encoding
[Buckman et al. 2018] neural networks to break the linearity. The method exploits
non-differentiable and non-linear transformation to the input replacing one-hot en-
coding to thermometer encoding as shown in Table VI. With the input x, an index
j ∈ {i, · · · , k}, and the thermometer τ(j) ∈ RK , the thermometer vector is formally
defined as follows:
τ(j)l =
{
1, if l ≥ j
0, otherwise
(19)
Then the thermometer (discretization) function f is defined pixel-wise for a pixel i ∈
{i, · · · , n} as:
ftherm(x)i = τ(b(xi)) = C(fonehot(xi)) (20)
where R is the cumulative sum function, C(c)l =
∑l
j=0 cl, and b is a quantization
function.
The stochastic gradients make a model obfuscated by test time randomness. The
algorithm randomly drops some neurons of each layer to 0 considering their original
output value, meaning that the network stochastically prunes a subset of the activa-
tions in each layer during the forward pass. The survived activations are scaled up to
normalize the dynamic range of the inputs to the subsequent layer [Dhillon et al. 2018].
Similarly, Guo et al. [2017] proposed a transformation approaches under the baseline
of image cropping, rescaling [Graese et al. 2016], bit-depth reduction [Xu et al. 2017],
JPEG compression [Kinga and Adam 2015], and total variance minimization [Rudin
et al. 1992]. Total variance minimization approach first drops pixels in a random man-
ner, and reconstructs images by replacing small patches using minimum graph cuts
in overlapping boundary regions to remove artificially crafted in the edge. The total
variation minimization of an image z is formalized as follows:
min
z
||(1− x˜) (z − x)||2 + λTV · TVp(z). (21)
where x˜ is a random set of pixels by sampling a Bernoulli random variable x(i, j, k) for
pixel location (i, j, k),  denotes element-wise multiplication, TV denotes total vari-
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ance, and TVp(z) represents Lp total variation of z. Finally, Buckman et al. [2018]
demonstrate thermometer code, which improves the robustness to adversarial attacks.
Samangouei et al. [2018] proposed Defense-GAN, which is a similar defense method
as PixelDefend, but it uses a GAN instead of a PixelCNN.
The vanishing/exploding gradients make a model unusable by deep computation.
The basic idea is to purify adversarially perturbed images back to clean examples by
exploiting a pixelCNN as a generative model. The purified image is then used for the
unmodified classifier. A recent defense algorithm exploits PixelCNN [Oord et al. 2016]
to build PixelDefend [Song et al. 2017] to approximate the training distribution. The
PixelCNN is a generative model which is designed for images tracking likelihood over
all pixels by factorizing it into a product of conditional distributions:
PCNN(x) =
∏
i
PCNN(xi|x1:(i−1)). (22)
The PixelDefend train a PixelCNN model on the CIFAR-10 dataset and use log-
likelihood to approximate the true probability density and experimented against ad-
versarial examples from RAND, FGSM, BIM, DeepFool and CW methods. The result
showed that PixelDefend obtains accuracy above 70% for all attacking techniques,
while maintaining the performance on clean images.
A robustness against iterative optimization attacks is a key idea for a good defense
system that is built a based on machine learning. Nevertheless, the existing gradient-
based defense algorithm is designed based on the gradient of the initial version, which
makes vulnerability to gradient based attack. The attack methods attempts to search
for a parameter υ such that image channel c(x + υ) 6= c∗(x) either maximizing or
minimizing ||υ||. Athalye et al. [2018] exploits projected gradient descent to set υ and
used l2 Lagrangian relaxation Carlini and Wagner [2017a]. With the attack methods,
Athalye et al. [2018] showed that most of the obfuscated gradient based defenses are
vulnerable to iterative optimization attacks [Kurakin et al. 2016a; Madry et al. 2017;
Carlini and Wagner 2017a] and become standard algorithm evaluating defenses.
3.2.2. Defense against Poisoning Attacks. The framework proposed from [Steinhardt
et al. 2017] takes the approach of removing outliers that are outside the applicable
set. In binary classification, they aim to find the centroids of the positive and nega-
tive classes. Then, they remove points that are too far away from each corresponding
centroid. To find these points, they make use of two methods: a sphere defense that
removes points outside the spherical radius, and a slab defense that discards points
that are too far away from the line in a complimentary way.
Koh and Liang [2017] uses influence functions to track model predictions and iden-
tify the most influential data points that are responsible for a given prediction. They
show that approximations in functions can still provide important information in non-
convex and non-differentiable models where the theory breaks down. They also claim
that by using influence functions, the defender can check out only the data prioritized
by its influence score. This method outperforms previous methods of identifying the
greatest training loss for removing the tainted examples.
Paudice et al. [2018b] also suggests a defense mechanism to mitigate the effects
of poisoning attacks on the basis of outlier detection. The attacker tries to have the
greatest effect on the defender with a limited number of poisoning points. To mitigate
this effect, they first divide the trustworthy dataset D into different classes, i.e., D+
and D−. Then, they use the curated data trains distance-based outlier detectors for
each class. The outlier detection algorithm calculates the outlier score for each x in
the original (total) data set. There are many ways to measure the outlier score, such
as using SVM or LOF as a detector. The empirical cumulative distribution function
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Fig. 9: Private AI: Potential threats in perspectives of (a) service provider, (b) informa-
tion silo, (c) user.
(ECDF) of training instances is used to calculate the threshold for detecting outliers.
By removing all of the samples that are expected to be contaminated, the defender can
collect new data sets to retrain the learning algorithm.
Paudice et al. [2018a] chooses to re-label data points that are considered to be out-
liers instead of removing them. The label flipping attack is a special case of data poi-
soning that allows an attacker to control the label of a small number of training points.
Paudice et al. [2018a] proposes a mechanism that considers the points farthest from
the decision boundary to be malicious, and it reclassifies them. The algorithm reas-
signs the label of each instance of using a k-NN. For each sample of training data, they
first find the closest k-NN using the Euclidean distance. If the number of data points
with the most common label among k-NN is equal to or greater than a given threshold,
the corresponding training sample is renamed to the most common label in the k-NN.
4. PRIVATE AI
Deep learning algorithms that account for most of the current AI systems rely highly
on data. Hence, DL is always exposed to privacy threats, and it is imperative that the
privacy of the training data be preserved. Hence we define Private AI, the AI system
that preserves the privacy of the concerned data.
4.1. Potential Threats from Different Perspectives
4.1.1. Potential Threats in the Service Providers Perspective.. When companies provide
deep learning models and services to the public, there are potential risks in that the
models leak private information even without revealing the original dataset. As shown
in Figure 9a, a model inversion attack occurs when an adversary uses the pre-trained
deep learning model to discover the data used in the model training. Such attacks seek
to manipulate the correlation between the target, the unknown input and the model
output.
Recent studies on inversion attacks show that a model inversion attack is possible,
by recovering images used in training [Fredrikson et al. 2015] or performing a mem-
bership test to know whether an individual is in a dataset or not [Shokri et al. 2017].
Furthermore, deployed deep learning services are exposed to data integrity attacks as
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:21
well. Because the deployed service demands the user’s data, adversaries can attempt
to break the integrity of the data at the servicing server. If a data holder includes the
collected data without an integrity check, the broken integrity can mislead or even
ruin the model.
4.1.2. Privacy Violation in Information Silos. Information silos are a group of exclusive
data management systems that are related. Data silos, often represented by hospi-
tals or government agencies, have data of a similar nature and can derive productive
output through collaborative data mining, but they do not share data by intellectual
property or privacy breach issues. As shown in Figure 9b, secure multi-party computa-
tion (SMC) occurs when a set of parties like silos, with private inputs wish to compute
some joint function of their inputs [Lindell 2005]. Similarly, the idea of secure multi-
party training, which trains a joint deep learning model of private data input, has
been emerging. In such training processes, the data privacy of each participant must
be preserved in the face of adversarial behavior by other participants or by an external
party.
Hitaj et al. [2017] shows that a distributed, federated, or decentralized deep learning
approach is fundamentally broken and does not protect the training sets of honest
participants from a GAN-based attack. The adversary based on GAN deceives a victim
into releasing more accurate information on sensitive data.
4.1.3. Potential Threats in the User’s Perspective. Because many deep learning-based
applications have been introduced in industry, such service users are under serious
threats of the invasion of privacy [Gilad-Bachrach et al. 2016; Sanyal et al. 2018].
Since deep learning models are too large and complicated [He et al. 2016; Huang et al.
2017a] to be computed on small devices such as mobile phones or smart speakers,
most service providers require users to upload their sensitive data, such as their voice
recordings or face images and compute on their (cloud) servers. The problem is that
upon uploading, the users lose control of their data. In other words, the users can-
not delete their data and cannot check how their data is used, as shown in Figure 9c.
As the recent Facebook’s privacy scandal suggests, even when there are some privacy
policies, it is difficult to notice or restrain from excessive data exploitation. In addition,
since hardware requirements for deep learning are enormous, Machine-Learning-as-
a-Service (MLaaS) provided by Google, Microsoft, or Amazon has gained in popularity
among deep learning-based service providers. Such remote servers even make it diffi-
cult to manage the users’ data privacy.
4.2. Defense Techniques against Potential Threats
Unlike many attacks that are attempted in the domain of SecureAI, only a few at-
tacks are attempted in the field of PrivateAI as well as defense with respect to privacy
preserved deep learning. We observed that this finding is due to the nature of privacy
preserving techniques. Exploiting traditional security to the field of deep learning re-
quire encryption and decryption phases, which make it impractical in a real world due
to the enormous computational complexity. As a result, a homomorphic encryption is
a one of the few security techniques that can be exploited in deep learning. As one fur-
ther step to Private AI, the differential privacy technique is actively exploited in deep
learning. In the following section, we detail Private AI, which adopts the most recent
privacy-preserving methods.
4.2.1. Homomorphic Encryption on Deep Learning. CryptoNets [Gilad-Bachrach et al.
2016] took the initiative of applying neural networks for inferencing on the encrypted
data. CryptoNets utilize the leveled HE scheme YASHE’ [Bos et al. 2013] for the
privacy-preserving inference on a pre-trained CNN model. It demonstrated over 99%
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accuracy in detecting handwritten digits (MNIST data set [LeCun et al. 2010]). How-
ever, leveled HE leads to serious degradation in terms of the model accuracy and ef-
ficiency. Furthermore, because of the square activation function being replaced from
nonpolynomial activation and the converted precision of the weights, the inferencing
model obtains results that are quite different from the trained model. Hence, it is not
suited for the recent complicated models [He et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2017a]. In addi-
tion, the latency of the computation is still of the order of hundreds of seconds, while
Gilad-Bachrach et al. [2016] achieved a throughput of 50,000 predictions in an hour.
Cryptonets’ ability to batch images together can be useful in which applications where
the same user wants to classify a large number of samples together. In the simplest
case in which the user only wants a single image to be classified, this feature does not
help.
In return, CryptoDL [Hesamifard et al. 2017] and Chabanne et al. [2017] attempted
to improve CryptoNets by low degree polynomial approximations on activation func-
tions. Chabanne et al. [2017] applied batch normalization to reduce the accuracy gap
between the actual trained model and the converted model with an approximated acti-
vation function at the inference phase. The batch normalization technique also enabled
fair predictions on a deeper model.
As a recent bootstrapping FHE technique was introduced [Chillotti et al. 2016],
TAPAS [Sanyal et al. 2018] and FHE-DiNN [Bourse et al. 2017] were proposed. Since
the method proposed by Chillotti et al. [2016] supports operations on binary data, both
utilized the concept of Binary Neural Networks (BNNs) [Courbariaux et al. 2016].
FHE-DiNN [Bourse et al. 2017] utilized discretized neural networks with different
weights and input dimensions to evaluate Chillotti et al. [2016] on DNNs. In compari-
son, TAPAS [Sanyal et al. 2018] binarized weights and enabled binary operations and
sparsifications techniques. Both FHE-DiNN and TAPAS showed faster prediction than
the approaches based on leveled HE. It is also notable that while leveled HE methods
only support batch predictions, bootstrapping FHE-based methods enabled the predic-
tions on single instances, which is more practical.
4.2.2. Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) on Deep Learning. There are two major
types of privacy-preserving deep learning algoirhtms related with multiple parties
known so far: ones are the algorithms based on the conventional distributed deep
learning algorithms [Dean et al. 2012; Abadi et al. 2016a; Lee et al. 2018] enables
the parties to participate in training or testing deep learning models without revealing
their data or models. The others are based on secure two-party computation (2PC) com-
bined with homomorphic encryption (HE) and garbled circuit (GC). Such algorithms
assume two parties which is a user who provides data and a server that operates deep
learning based on the provided data. Modern cryptography techniques combined with
MPC techniques such as oblivious transfer, they attempted to securely secure the data
transfer process as well.
Distributed selective SGD (DSSGD) [Shokri and Shmatikov 2015] proposed collabo-
rative deep learning protocols with different data holders to train joint deep learning
models without sharing their training data. This approach is very similar to the prior
distributed deep learning algorithms [Dean et al. 2012; Abadi et al. 2016a; Lee et al.
2018]. With the coordinated learning models and objectives, the participants train
their local models and selectively exchange their gradients and parameters at every
local SGD epoch asynchronously. On the other hand, since DSSGD assumes the pa-
rameter server [Li et al. 2014], Aono et al. [2018] pointed out that even with a few gra-
dients, it is possible to restore the data used in training. Hence, to preserve the privacy
against the honest-but-curious parameter server, LWE-based homomorphic encryption
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was applied with exchanging weights and gradients. The improved privacy achieved
by homomorphic encryption, however, trades off with the communication costs.
Secure two-party compuation (2PC) algorithms include SecureML [Mohassel and
Zhang 2017], MiniONN [Liu et al. 2017], DeepSecure [Rouhani et al. 2018] and
Gazelle [Juvekar et al. 2018]. SecureML [Mohassel and Zhang 2017] is the first pri-
vacy preserving method to train neural networks in multi-party computation settings.
Using MPC and secret sharing, SecureML can train machine learning algorithms such
as linear regression, logistic regression and neural networks. Although the authors of
[Mohassel and Zhang 2017] attempts to speedup computation but SecureML still re-
quires large amounts of communication. MiniONN [Liu et al. 2017] transforms the
original neural network into oblivious neural network for training, using a simplified
homomorphic encryption. MiniONN also utilized garbled circuit to approximate the
non-linear activation functions. DeepSecure [Rouhani et al. 2018] computes encrypted
data inference on DL model using Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao 1986] and suggests some
practical computing structure and security proof. As the authors of [Juvekar et al.
2018] pointed out, the aforementioned work showed that homomorphic encryption
(HE) mainly shows strength in matrix-vector multiplications but restricted to linear
operations. On the other hand, garbled circuits (GC) can cause serious communiation
overhead while more suited in approximating non-linear functions in DNN models.
Hence Gazelle [Juvekar et al. 2018] combines HE and GC that computes linear opera-
tions with HE and activation functions with GC.
4.2.3. Differential Privacy on Deep Learning. By applying differential privacy to the
deep learning models, the training data can be protected from the inversion attacks
when the model parameters are released. Hence, there are many studies that uti-
lize the differential privacy to deep learning models. Such methods assume that the
training datasets and parameters of the model are the database and the responses,
respectively, and prove that their algorithms satisfy either Equation 5 or 6.
Depending on where the noise is added, such approaches can be divided into three
groups: gradient-level [Abadi et al. 2016b; McMahan et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018; Acs
et al. 2018; Yu et al. 2019], objective-level [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009; Phan et al.
2016, 2017a,b] and label-level [Papernot et al. 2016a, 2018; Triastcyn and Faltings
2018]. The gradient level approach injects noise into the gradients of the parameters
in the training phase. The objective-level approach introduces the perturbed objec-
tive function by injecting the noise into the coefficients of the original objective func-
tion. The label-level approach introduces noise into the label in the knowledge transfer
phase of the teacher student model.
The gradient-level approach [Abadi et al. 2016b] proposed a differential private SGD
(DP-SGD) algorithm that adds noise to the gradients in the batch-wise updates. It is
important to estimate the accumulated privacy loss as learning progress by batch. In
particular, the authors of [Abadi et al. 2016b] proposed the moment accountant to track
the cumulative privacy loss. The moment accountant algorithm considers privacy loss
as a random variable and estimates the tail bound of it. The resulting bounds pro-
vide a tighter level of privacy than using the basic or strong composition theorems
[Dwork et al. 2006, 2010]. McMahan et al. [2018] introduced user-level differentially
private LSTM. In language modeling, it is difficult and ineffective to keep privacy as
the word level. Therefore, McMahan et al. [2018] defined user-level adjacent datasets
and ensured differential privacy for users. Xie et al. [2018] proposed a Differentially
Private Generative Adversarial Network (DPGAN). They injects noise into the gradi-
ent of discriminator to get the differentially private discriminator and the generator
which is trained with that discriminator also become differentially private based on
the post-processing theory [Dwork et al. 2014].
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Fig. 10: Overview of differential privacy in deep learning framework
Acs et al. [2018] introduces a differentially private generative model which has
mixture of k generative neural networks such as restricted Boltzamnn machine
(RBM) [Goodfellow et al. 2016] and variational autoencoder (VAE) [Kingma and
Welling 2013]. They applies differnetially private kernel k-means algorithm for clus-
tering the original datasets and uses DP-SGD [Abadi et al. 2016b] to train the each
neural networks. They extends the diffentially private k-means clustering [Blum et al.
2005] by applying random Fourier features [Chitta et al. 2012] and improves the accu-
racy of the trained model by carefully adjusting injected noised in DP-SGD framework.
Yu et al. [2019] introduces some techniques which can be utilized to DP-SGD [Abadi
et al. 2016b]. Abadi et al. [2016b] assumes that the bathing method for mini-batch SGD
is random sampling, however, in practice, random reshuffling is a widely used batching
method. Yu et al. [2019] suggest privacy accounting methods for each case and analyze
the characteristics. They also apply concentrated DP (CDP) [Bun and Steinke 2016] to
achieve tighter estimation for a large number of iterations and dynamic privacy budget
allocation mechanism to improve the performance.
The objective-level approach [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009] disturbs the orig-
inal objective function by adding noise to the coefficients. Then, the model trained
on the disturbed objective function is differential private. Unlike the gradient-level
approach, whose privacy loss is accumulated as training progresses, the privacy loss
of the objective-level approach is determined at the building objective function and
is independent of the epochs. To inject noise into the coefficients, the objective func-
tion should be a polynomial representation of the weights. If an objective function
is not a polynomial form, the objective-level approach approximates it to the polyno-
mial representation using approximation techniques such as Taylor or Chebyshev ex-
pansion. Then, the noise is added to each coefficient to obtain the disturbed objective
function. Chaudhuri and Monteleoni [2009] proposed the differentially private logis-
tic regression, whose parameters are trained based on the perturbed objective func-
tion. The functional mechanism is applied not only to logistic regression but also to
various models such as auto-encoders [Bengio et al. 2009] and convolutional deep be-
lief networks [Lee et al. 2009]. Phan et al. [2016] proposed deep private auto-encoder
(dPA) and proved that the dPA is differential private based on the functional mech-
anism. Phan et al. [2017a] introduced the private convolutional deep belief network
(pCDBN), and they utilized the Chebyshev expansion to approximate the objective
function to the polynomial form. Phan et al. [2017b] developed a novel mechanism,
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called Adaptive Laplace Mechanism (AdLM). The key concept is to add ’more noise’
to the input features that are less relevant to the model output, and vice-versa. Phan
et al. [2017b] injects noise from the Laplace distribution into the Layer-wise Relevance
Propagation (LRP) [Bach et al. 2015a] to estimate the relevance between the output
of the model and the input features. They apply an affine transformation based on the
estimated relevance to distribute the noise adaptively. AdLM also applies a functional
mechanism that perturbs the objective function. These differential private actions are
processed before training the model.
The label-level approach injects noise into the knowledge transfer phase of the
teacher-student framework. Papernot et al. [2016a] proposed the semi-supervised
knowledge transfer model, which is called the Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensem-
bles (PATE) mechanism. PATE is a type of teacher-student model, and its purpose is to
train a differentially private classifier (student) based on an ensemble of non-private
classifiers (teacher). Figure 10 shows the overview of the PATE approach. Each teacher
model learns on disjoint training datasets, and the output of the teacher ensemble is
determined by noisy aggregation of each teacher’s prediction. The noisy aggregation
introduces a noisy label that meets DP, and then, the student model learns the noisy
label from the teacher ensemble as a target label. Because the student model cannot
access the training data directly and the differential private noise is injected into the
aggregation process, PATE ensures safety intuitively and in terms of the DP, respec-
tively. PATE utilizes the moment accountant to trace the cumulated privacy budget in
the learning process. Later, Papernot et al. [2018] extended the PATE to operate on
a large scale environment by introducing a new noisy aggregation mechanism. They
showed that the improved PATE outperforms the original PATE on all measures and
has high utility with a low privacy budget. Triastcyn and Faltings [2018] applied the
PATE to build the differential private GAN framework. The discriminator of GAN
frameworks is a type of classifier that determines whether the input data is real or
fake. By using PATE as a discriminator, the generator trained with the discriminator
is also differential private.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1. Challenges and Future Research Directions
From Section 3, we confirmed that there exist attack methods that can fool or subvert
the deep learning models. We reviewed two types of attack scenarios which are the
white-box attack and black-box attack. In white-box attack scenarios, most adversaries
generate adversarial examples by taking advantage of the gradients of the target DL
model, and those examples showed very high misclassification rate. It is crucial for the
success of such attacks to acquire the true gradients from the vanilla model, which
is the model without any defense method applied, to find sparse or blind spots of the
target model. Hence, to defend against such attack methods, many researchers pro-
posed diverse gradient masking defense methods, and these methods showed decent
achievements by involving more nonlinearity in a model or preventing the gradients
of the model from being copied by an adversary. As the authors of [Athalye et al. 2018]
suggest, proper gradient methods show powerful defense performance.
Therefore, it is believed to be beneficial if interpretable AI approaches [Simonyan
et al. 2013; Bach et al. 2015b; Shrikumar et al. 2017] can be applied to such attack or
defense methods. Interpretable AI analyzes the underlying functions of the deep learn-
ing model and determine the way that a deep learning model makes predictions. With
deeper understanding of deep learning models, it will be feasible to make a system
(model) robust to unseen attacks by identifying blind spots that should be considered
and addressed.
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From Section 3.1.2, we reviewed some poisoning attack methods on deep learning
models. The recent approaches include outlier detections to eliminate [Paudice et al.
2018b] or re-label [Paudice et al. 2018a] the suspected poisoned examples. However, it
is a concern that such actions might constrain the decision boundary of the models too
much. As Figure 8 suggests, the elimination or re-labeling of some data points can vary
a model’s decision boundary a large amount. In addition, the degradation of the model
accuracy might instead make the model susceptible to the other poisoning approaches.
Hence, we need some metrics or evaluation methods to determine whether the model
is defended to be safe and sound.
In addition, we reviewed the privacy-preserving deep learning models with the full
homomorphic encryption cryptosystems applied in Section 4.2.1. Although the recent
methods achieved a high prediction rate despite the strict encryption, the performance
in accuracy falls behind the state-of-the-art model performances, and it is not compat-
ible for deeper models. The main reason for this situation is that the FHE methods
used in those papers do not include the nonlinear activation functions discussed in
Section 2.1.1. Hence, current FHE-based prediction models use different models from
the actual trained models. In other words, they train the unencrypted data on the un-
encrypted typical models, and then, the trained weights and biases are applied to a
different model, in which the activation functions are replaced to simple activations
such as square functions. A discrepancy between the training and inference models
usually causes high degradation in the prediction accuracy. To overcome this deterio-
ration, two approaches are possible: either train the same model from the beginning,
or properly transfer the model. As the authors of [Hinton et al. 2015] suggest, the
knowledge learned by a DL model can be distilled into another model.
In Section 4.2.3, a large number of attempts were confirmed using differential pri-
vacy to protect data privacy in deep learning training. Such methods add noise to
gradients or objective functions to confuse the attacker, and give closed-form proof
on the differential privacy bounds of the proposed methods. However, from the DL
researchers’ perspectives, such bounds are insufficient to give practical insights on
whether such a privacy bound is strong enough or not. If differential privacy re-
searchers can provide experiments on the assumed attack scenarios or some practical
evaluations or metrics, it should be much more informative.
5.2. Practical Issues and Suggestions for Deployment
The deep learning model variants might pose threats on the model security and data
privacy. Because deep learning models are very complicated, it is difficult to think of
a new model structure. Hence, once a model structure is deployed, a large number
of users add some variants for their uses and train further with their own data. In
the case of U-Net [Ronneberger et al. 2015], which is a CNN model used for image
segmentation in the biomedical field, there are several variants [C¸ic¸ek et al. 2016; Li
et al. 2017; Jo et al. 2018] proposed. If such similar models are deployed in public, it
is likely to be susceptible for the attacks reviewed in this paper. They might give clues
in building substitute models in black-box attack scenarios, or induce easier inversion
attacks based on the accumulated knowledge from the similar models. Hence, we must
be careful when deploying models, especially when there is a large number of variants.
Practical considerations on the processing time and throughput are needed as well.
Although FHE combined with deep learning predictions showed remarkable perfor-
mances both in the privacy and utility, it lacks the considerations of practical imple-
mentations. Because predictions on FHE data and models are still too slow, parallel
or distributed processing using GPUs or clusters is crucial. In particular, since GPUs
have already achieved high computational speeds in deep learning training, combin-
ing GPU’s high computing power with FHE model prediction is promising. Considering
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those situations in which we need FHE on predictions when the computing resources
of the user devices are insufficient, on-device encryption and decryption should be con-
sidered as well.
6. SUMMARY
Deep learning has become one of the inseparable technologies in our daily lives, and
the problem of security and privacy of deep learning has become an issue that can no
longer be overlooked. Therefore, we defined Secure AI and Private AI, and we reviewed
the related attack and defense methods.
In Secure AI, we surveyed the two types of attacks: evasion attack and poisoning
attack. We categorized the attack scenarios as white-box and black-box attacks, ac-
cording to the amount of information and the authority of the model that the adver-
sary possesses. In this process, we confirmed that many research studies have been
conducted with advanced and varied attack methods. On the other hand, the studies
on the defense techniques are in relatively early stages. In this paper, we introduce
the related studies by classifying them as gradient masking, adversarial training and
statistical approaches.
Furthermore, the risk of data privacy violations is always widespread due to the
characteristics of deep learning, which highly relies on an extensive amount of data,
and the era of the fourth industrial revolution, in which data itself is the enormous
asset. In this paper, we describe the possible threats on the data privacy from the
perspectives of deep learning models and service providers, information silos and
deep learning-based service users. In addition, we name the deep learning-based ap-
proaches that are concerned with data privacy as Private AI. Unlike Secure AI, there
are not many studies on privacy attacks using deep learning. Hence, we introduce re-
cent studies on three defending techniques concerned with Private AI: homomorphic
encryption, differential privacy, and secure multi-party training. Finally, open prob-
lems and directions for future work are discussed.
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